Annals of Economic and Social Measurement, Volume 4, number 1 by Martin David
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: Annals of Economic and Social Measurement, Volume 4, number
1




Chapter Title: Measurement of the Cost of Living Including the Public Sector
Chapter Author: Martin David
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c10221
Chapter pages in book: (p. 133 - 152)Annals of Economic and Social Measurement. 4 I. 1975
MEASUREMENT OF THE COST OFLIVING INCLUDiNG THE
PUBLIC SECTOR
BY MARTIN DAVID
Since 1948 the (P1. Con sunier Price Index,has become a less sat isf aclory indicator of051 a) living.
COL, as it relates to a limited and declining fractionof goterament product. This paper analysesthe j,roh-
lems in constructing a COL index that makesadequate allowance for changes in thequality and relaiiie
importance of government services in theconsumer's consumption patterns. A proposal jrattitudinal
,neasures of COL is detelopd. Inaddition a strategy for using existingexpenditure and government
data is presented.
I. JNTROI)UCTION
Government activity constitutes alarge and universally acknowledgedfraction
of the total national product.Accounting for government in a measureof the
consumer's cost of living (COL) is clearlyessential to understanding the changing
welfare of individuals in the economy.Yet. at the present time, neither anofficial
COL indicator for private commodities, nor asystem for developingthe COL
index for public and private goodstogether exists.
By default the consumer priceindex (CPL) is used as a measureof the change
in real purchasing power of the consumer.Increasing reliance is placed on the CPL
to guide macro-policy, toescalate wages in labor contracts,and to compute
subsistence standards used in incomemaintenance payments. Reliance onthe
CPI has increased despite asecular increase in the role ofgovernment in the
national product and enormousqualitative shifts in the quality and mixof govern-
ment services.
I would guess that the changein the consumer price indexsince 1948 over-
states decreases in consumerwelfare. I assume (and these assumptions aredebat-
able) that increasing incomehas caused substitution infavor of government
services so that price indicesof private products relate to a smallershare of total
consumption. I also assume that thequality of government goods hasincreased
substantially so that changes inthe cost of inputs included in consumerprice
indices do not reflect changes inthe unit costs of goods enjoyed.
It is because such guessescannot be challenged byexisting studies that
economists need to concernthemselves with the measurementof the cost of
living including the public sector.This paper provides a conceptualframework for
addressing the measurement ofCOL including government andoffers ajudgement
on an appropriate strategyfor research in this field. inthe process the relevant
literature is reviewed. Nocomputations are offered as a solution tothe measure-
ment problem; that mustbe tackled in future work.
We have made little progressin developing price indices forpublic services
since the global scrutiny that wasgiven the problem by the StiglerComtnission
133(1961). At the same time the fieldofpublic finance hasadvanced itstlflderstafldiflgf the theory of public goods,particularly local publicgoods. I believe itis nowp. sible to point towardsa number of lines for researchon the prices ofpublic goods that will lead to useful indicesof consumer welfare.
To assess the problemsthat beset the developmentof indices ofthe priceof public services Ishafl beginwith a review ofa numberof issues thatmust be dealt with in anymeasurement effort. The basicconcern of this paper isto discuss the means for assessing the welfare ofthe consumer.Historically, we haveused price indices as a tool to that end--if the bundle of goodsconsumed last yearCosts less at today's prices, we surmisethat the Consumer isbetter off Theparadoxes created by weighting indexesof prices by diftrent fixed
commodity bundleslead to the more naturalconcept of a cost of living index(Christensen andManser, 1973). The cost of livingis the dollar cost ofmaintaining a fixedlevel of utility. Over time theconsumer may substitute onecommodity for anotheias relative prices change. Thecost of living is invariantto such shifts; thecost of !iving concept will be the primary frameof reference for thediscussion in thispaper. Superficially it wouldappear that the cost of livingframework extendsin a logical fashion to thecase in which theconsumer bundle of goodsincludes both public goods and goodssold on the privatemarketplace. In thefourth sectionof this paper weundertake to explain inwhat sense suchan extension is valid. First we must deal witha variety of ancillaryquestions that causedme a good deal of confusion, and thathave not been discussedin an integratedfashion inconnec. tion with the problemsof developing indicesof consumerwelfare.
2. CONCEPTUAL ISSUESIN THE MEASUREMENTOF CONSUMER PRICESIN THE PunLfc SECTOR
Uuits of Pub/ic Goodsand Services
Unfortunately the quantityof public goods andservices is not alwaysexplicitly defined. While theout put of postal servicescan easily be measured inunits com- parable to privateindustry (number ofletters delivered,total letter-miles of services producedj,the units ofoutput in otherareas--e.g. education, health, and policeserviceshave not beenCompletely specified andwidely recognized. Ancillary tomeasurement of COL includinggovernment units of output must be conceptualizedand quantities ofoutput measured.
Qua/it)' Change
A second issue inthe computationof a cost of livingindex that spans both public and privategoods is Change inthe quality of thegood or service delivered (Grijjches 1971). Overthe period sinceWorld War IIwe have seen significant changes in a varietyof public servicesthat must beregarded as a shift in the quality of service rendered:
1. In nationalaffairs the spaceprogram appears asa new commodity in the mix of thegovernrneproduct.
1342In transportation the development of thefreeway network represents a
shift in the quality of transportation. due toits limited access, high-speed
design characteristics. (ihesamechange in design ippears to he associated
With a downwards shift in the risk of traflicfatalities [or cacti vehicle-mite).
3. We have also seen Jiangcs in the qualityof the environment, both neat lye
and positive. Solid waste disposal standardsadopted beginning in 1968
imply that trash and garbage arc beingsubjected to less polluting disposal.
()n the other hand, increasing use of outdoor recreationfacilities has implied
increased congestion, queues, and environmentaldegradation in public
parks and recreation areas (CF. US. Council ofEnvironmental Quality,
1972.)
Each of these examples points to the factthat a quality dimension is an extremely
signhlicant part of the public sector output.More miles of road. days of school
children taught. or letters delivered are notvalued in the same ltshioit by the
consumer as decreases inroad congestion. increases in achievement scoresof high
school graduates, or reductions in theelapsed time for the delivery of mail.
The implication of changes in thequality of public services is that a studyof
the cost of living including government musthe careful to include measures of the
quality of government output as well asthe quantity in the measurementof the
utility function. (Perhaps the only areawhere some serious efforts along these
lines arc being made is in the fieldof medical care.) Where explicit measurementof
quality can not be included in the measurementprocess. we must be clear that
statistics which treat the governmentservices of 1974 equivalent to service of
1948 or 1929 are based on some reasonableevidence.
Fortunately, a number of investigations in a varietyof areas offer suggestions
on how the qualityof public services can be assessed. Continuingstudies in the
field of transportation have lead to a precisetheory concerning the relationship
between congestion and the utility ofconsumption of transport services to the
public (Mohring, 1972). Such work can beextended to the public's use of other
public facilities. A second type of investigationhas investigated the quality of
interaction between public agencies andtheir clientele (Handler and Hollings-
worth, 1971). Other studies have made abeginning on the cost of compliance with
the law to the individual consumer (Willis,1969).
Several recent studies have treated thequality of government services as a
joint product achieved by distributing alevel of government service expenditure
over a population (Inman,1971 Borcherding and Deacon, 1972;and Bergstrom
and Goodman. 1973). That is, thefollowing assumptions are made:
Government services are subject tocongestion as more persons are
served.
Increasing expenditure can offset congestion sothat
=qN
where f denotes expenditures for governmentservices, q is the quality of the
service enjoyed andNis the population served.' 0 (= 0 is the pure
Alteritalivety q may be interpreted as a quantityhowever,that inlerpretation implies that
productionoF services is less efficient as populationserved rises. This appeals less plausible than the
interpretation in the text.
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Spublic good Iis the pure private good,distributed iii anegalitarj,1 This solution to the problemef1ct i vely assumes ita way, and will he adeqii ate for only a limited number of publicservices 'hat have substitutes in thePrivate market or can be rationed by some, albeitexpensive, price mechauisri'
The Production Function forPublic Outputs
This last point naturallylcds to the question of howpublic goodsare pro. duced. On close examinationwe find that many public servicesare in fact inter. mediate goods thatmust he combined with inputs fromthe householdbefore a valued output is created. The roadis worthless in theabsence ofconsumer invest. ment in automobiles. In pricing thecost of living includinggovernethen, we must be careful to treatIntermediate goods as such. Wewish to price thecost of living that at one timemay include access to work onan interurban (withcapi( supplied by a regulatedmonopoly) and at anotherwill includea substantial consumer investment incars alongside public investmentin roadways
The Price u/ Pithlje Goods
Having come this far, andhaving decided thatwe must measure theunits of output of public servicesreceived by aconsumer, the quality of thoseservices and the degree to whichconsumer goods are an intermediateproduct input into the production ofgovernment outputs, we arenow in a position toexamine the concept of "cost" or "price"to the consumer forpublic output. Some services ofgovcrnmcn5 are priced. However,
charges Collected by government are seldom auser fee that Correspondsto the market price forprivately produced commodities Theprice of services, suchas water supply,may reflect the full cost to themunicipality of providingthe service, hut suchprices fail to include the subsidythat arises fromFederal tax exemptionof interest onmunicipal bonds or the subsidy thatthe municipalgovernment obtains fromexemption from the local propertytax. Pricing of roadsand bridges, in particular,has been faulted for failing to includethe true socialcost ofcongestion Lastly,few if anygovernment enterprises includea "normal" rate ofreturn on their capitalstock. Explicit priced set bygovernment will not reflect thecost of the majority of public goods receivedby the Consumer.Even for municipalities,who rely on fees and charges fora larger portion of theirfinances than higherlevel governments, the ratio of chargesto taxes is about one-fifth(Mushkin 1972, Table 1.5). Lacking an indicationof price in the feescharged bygovernment, we must construct a substitute. Letus call the substitutea cost of output measure.Con- siderable progress isbeing made in thisarea. Cost functions havebeen derived for a number of localgovernment services (Morris,1973; Rieuw, 1972; Hirsch,1973, Hirsch, 1972).Unfortunately,most of the studies todate have dealt withcross- sections that givesome perspectiveon the differences incost of production in different geographicalareas with littlecontrol for the differencesin quality of services. Geographicaldifferences in cost donot reflect movement alonga produc- tion function ina particular locality.Moreover it is clear thatin some services.
136economies of scak exist over a limited range of provision. so thatthe niceties of
production under constant returns to scale do not generallyapply.2
Another difficulty compounds the problem of scale economies. Theproduc-
Lion of government services takes place in a variety of market areas.School
districts have one local market area, sewage treatment servicesanother, while some
services, such as hospitals may lack a clearly defined market area orclientele.
If the production function is, in fact, not homothetic, dealing with aggregatesof
input costs over several districts, or the smallest commensurableunit, will result
in assigning the wrong weights to districts that operate in a rangeof decreasing
costs relative to those that are constant cost.I feel this is a serious problem.
Even after the problems besetting the measurementof cost of government
services have been resolved, a measure of the cost of livingincluding government is
still not defined. Government services are not equally consumedby all segments
of the population, nor are they equally financed by all segmentsof the population.
The problems involved in evaluating the benefits and costsof public service are
familiar to each of us who has dabbled in studies of theincidence of government.
(A careful review of the issues, and discussion of theproblems of valuing redistribu-
tional expenditures appears in Neenan, et al., (1974),assessing the net benefit of
the fisc.)
Incidence of the Public Fisc and its Relation to the Pricing ofPublic Services
At this point in time there are two threads to the literaturein public finance
concerning incidence: the voluntary exchange (Lindahi) theoryof fiscal equilibrium
and the median voter theory of equilibrium. In the voluntaryexchange theory
voters (or their representatives) are assumed to bargain inthe trading of votes until
a Pareto-optimal solution is reached. Thesolution is characterized by two condi-
tions: (1)tax shares of the cost of government are allocated toindividuals in accord
with their marginal valuation of government product; and (2) themarginal social
benefit of government summed over all individuals is exactly equal tothe cost of
private goods foregone at the margin (Foley, 1970). This modelfails to capture
reality for several reasons. Sizeable transactions costs inachieving a bargain
have not yet been incorporated into the theory. Impure publicgoods (subject to
congestion) imply that a coalition of voters may achieve an increasein their own
utility by threat of withdrawal from the group. When effective,the threat leaves the
remaining voters in disequilibrium and the Pareto optimal solutiondoes not lie
in core (Ellickson, 1973).
The theory of the median voter is less demanding than thetheory of Lindahi
equilibrium. It gives us less information and has its ownlimitations. Certain types
of strategic behavior (side-payments and vote trading) can notbe admitted. The
theory assumes that voter preferences on expenditure issues canbe monotonicaily
ranked in relation to income (see Bergstrom and Goodman,1973).
If we accept the assumptions of the Lindahlequilibrium, then the price of
public goods to each citizen voter is the productof his tax share and the marginal
2 Providing that the production function is linear and homogeneous. however, a axed weight index
exists that relates the cost of the factor inputs to the cost of the service beingrendered. This is the basis
on which Begstrom and Goodman, 1973. obtain theirestimates o1ost of government services.
137cost of production ofthe public service.Furthermore, thecitizen-voteris in equilibrium. so thatobservations on allindividualscan be usedto arriveat estimates of a utilityfunction. If weaccept the assumptions
underlying thetheory ofthe medianvoter, we admit a broaderscope for the publicsector butwe must accept that only themedian voteron a particular issues in equilibrium.In that case only the commoditybundle consumedby the medianvoter is relevantfor the estimation of a utilityfunction. The priceofpublic services isthe taxshareofthe median voter timesthe costofproductionofthe unit of thepublic good.Hence- forth, I use theterm tax price of publicservices to referto this product. The usefulness ofthe theory of themedian voter willbe discussedfurther in the fourth sectionof the paper. Forthe moment, theargument can besummarized by stating thatsome assumptionscan be made that leadto dearconclusions about (I) the tax price ofpublic servicesto individualconsumers and (ii)the suitabilityof information fromconsumers as a basis forestimating a utilityfunction. Jurisdiction
One additionalissue must beraised beforewe can proceedto a discussionof estimating publicprices. Publicgoods and servicesare delivered bya Federal system that admitssubstantial variationin the qualityand quantityof localpublic services deliveredin any particulargeographic location.Heterogeneity ofservice
levels in anarea, and indeedheterogeneity ofservice over thewhole country, create a situation inwhich consumerequilibrium isestablished jointlyby a decision to locate inone of several politicaljurisdictions andthe purchaseof a bundleof consumption goods.The nature ofthis politicaland economicequilibriumwas best describedby Ellickson,1971. It is not clearthat an equilibriumcan be reached when redistributionalfunctions aremandated to locallevels ofgovernment (Rothenberg, 1970and Bradfordand Kelegian,1973). The implicationof these ideasis that acost of living indexmust adequately deal with changesin the costof migrationincluding deadweightloss from the sale of housingin less attractiveareas, the unemployment
associated withreloca- tion, and thecost of acquiring
information aboutpublic servicesin alternative jurisdictions. ACOL indexfor familieswith fixed placesof residence willbe inadequate.
Secondly, theexistence ofvariation in servicelevels acrossjurisdictions, variation in thecost of producingpublic servicesin differentjurisdictions, and variations in thetax share ofthe medianvoter in different
jurisdictions imply that an indexof tax pricesmust either bedisaggregatedover jurisdictions,or must pool dataover jurisdictionsthat may beregarded as similarwith respectto local conditions of thepublic sector.
This secondpoint parallelsthe concernexpressed by Reidthat the national CPI can notrelate toa meaningfulconcept ofconsumer welfare,when regional variation in thecost of housingand foodimplies moderateand changinggeo- graphical differentialsin the priceindices fordifferentareas. Summary
This review ofissues laysOut the problemsthat must besolved ifmeasurement
of COLincludinggovernment is toproceed successfully.Units of publicoutput
138must be conceptualizedand quantities of output must bemeasured. Quality
change must be adequatelyresearched; production functions mustbe estimated to
arrive at meaningful cost functions;the consonance between publicchoice an
consumer equilibrium must bemade clear; and theroleofjurisdictiOfl in providing
heterogeneous prices for heterogeneousbundles of public goods must beclarified.
Before proceeding to discuss the stepsthat must be taken to implementCOL
indices, it seems appropriate to demonstratethat the CPI is not an adequate proxy
for a cost of living indicator includinggovernment services.
3. ADEQUACY OF TUE CPI FORMEASURING THE PRICI OF GOVERNMENTSERVICES
Current Treatment
Though each of us isfamiliar with themethodology of the CPI, it maybe
useful to review the treatment ofthe government sector in thatprice index, to
remind us of the problems that othershave long sincerecognized.3 First, the CPI
makes no explicit provision forthe output of government unlessit is sold (as in
the case of services of municipalutilities).
Secondly, goods purchased on themarket are priced at market pricesinclud-
ing indirect (sales, customs, andexcise) taxes. The portion of taxesinducing market
price changes will be reflected inthe price index.
Thirdly, the index omits taxes that arelevied on individual income,transfers
of wealth, and the unshiftedportions of the corporate income,payroll, and business
property taxes.
This treatment has been discussedand criticized by Kessel andHansen.
Kessel (1961), in his staff paper tothe Stigler Commission,pointed out that the
principal use of the Consumer PriceIndex is to measure a level ofwell-being for
the consumer by pernhitting thecomputation of real wages. He thenwent on to
indicate that the index is asymmetricin its treatment of taxes. Wages aremeasured
at factor prices; goods aremeasured at market prices,including indirect taxes.
A change in the structure oftaxation induces a change in the measureof the real
wage. As indirect taxesrise, the CPI measure increaseswhile money wages and
government activity may remain constant.The resulting apparent fall inreal wages
does not reflect a true change inthe cost of living (although theshift of direct into
indirect taxes may imply markedchanges in the distributionof welfare for some
individuals in the society).
Hansen (1958) also comments onthis peculiarity as he attempts to answerthe
question: Should the price indicatorused for stabilization purposesinclude or
exclude taxes? Apart from thecosmetic problem that the stabilizing taxesare
reflected in the index beingmonitored for stability, Hansenconcludes that full
inclusion of both direct and indirect taxesis less arbitrary than partialinclusion
and perhaps superior to thecomplete ommissiofi of the governmentsector from a
consumer price index.
The standard references on CPImethodology are U.S. Department Labor (1971),Stigter (1961).
and U.S. Bureau of the Census (1968).
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.Structural Changes in thePublic Sector
The merit of Hansen andKcssels observationsis clear whenone examinesthe recent history of thegovernment sector in the U.S.Six relevantpOtflts may be made:
1. The share ofgovernment in the nationalproduct has increased
markedly (Expenditures for goodsand services rose from13.() percentof NNP i 1948 to.24.2 percentin 1972).
2, The share of thestate and localgovernments in exhaustive
spending by government has also increased,from 47.7 percentin 1948 to590percent in 1972.
Transfer payments bythe government alsoincreased markedly. The social insurancecomponent of those transfers
was fInanced bylarge increases in payrolltaxes that reduce theshare of incometaxes. Payroll taxes increased from 10.4percent of Federal budgetary
receipts in 1948to 27.6 percent in 1972.
At the State andLocal level, adoptionsof incometaxes have sharply increased the relianceof those governmentson direct taxsources. In 1948 4.t percent ofState and Localrevenues were derivedfrom individual income taxes; in 197112.5 percentcame from thatsource. Lastly, Federalgovernment transfers to Stateand Local levelsof govern- ment have increasedrapidly. so thata smaller fraction ofState and Local government product isfinanced by locallyraised revenue.4In 1948 such grants were 11.3percent of receipts:in 1971 grants-in-aidwere 26.5 percent.
What do thesechanges imply forthe utility of theCPI calculation? I. Increasingthe relativescope of governmentimplies that theproportion of goods and servicesconsumed by thehousehold explicitlytreated by the CPIhas fallen. Pricing isdirectly germaneto a smaller andsmaller proportionof the consumer's real goodsand servicesconsumed. We needto ask if this isa desirable situation.
The increase inthe State andLocal share ofexpenditures forgovernment product implies thatthe heterogeneityof service levelsand qualitiesbecomes a more serious questionfor index numberconstruction. The increase intransfer paymentsto individuals raisesthe interestingquestion should a realbenefit of transfersbe ascribedto the high-incomevoters who altruistically yieldfactor incometo alleviatepoverty (1-Iochman andRodgers, 1970, Smolensky,ci al. 1974).
The increasedrole of payrolltaxes in the Federal
government sector increases the degree towhich marketpricing reflectsthe cost of thatsector to the extent that such taxesare shifted forwardto the consumer.That effect is offsetby expansion of the Federalsector and associatedincome taxesso that conclusionsconcerning impact on realwage measurementdepend on empiricalvalues and cannotbe determineda priori.
The corollaryis that the localcost or expandingState and localGovernment output has ralI..
because of matching
grants. At the sametime the tax price
to the citizen-voter is lessas the proportion
or taxpayersitemizing propertyta deductions hasincreased.
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eThe increased reliance by stateand local governments on incometaxation
unambiguously reduces the extent towhich cost of that governmentproduct is
reflected in the CII.
The increase in Federal aid Lu stateand local governnlcnls imphes an un-
ambiguous decrease in the extent towhich local governmentservices arc priced
in connection with the CPI,although the effect for the aggregateof all government
services will depend, as is suggestedby point 4 above, on thechange in the pro-
portion of the Federal sector thatis priced in connection withCPI.
Table l reflects the combinedeffects on these various trends onthe degree to
which the market price assumptionsof the CPI implicitly reflectchanges in the
cost of government
TABLE I





butionv and Corporate Ratio ol Excise and Customs to
Sector Tax Accruals to Customs to Purchases of (ioods
and Year Total Receipts Total Receipts and Ser. Ices
As there is probably no cortsensuson the best way toestimate implicit
coverage of governmentby the CPI, several comparisonsare included in theTable.
Price effects of governmentfinance are most completelyrepresented in the CPI
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1972 0.853 0.815if all corporate income tax levies and employment taxesare Shifted lorwardto consumers. Thus indirect taxes, payroll taxes and corporate incomelevies musthe addcd to measure the proportion of tax receipts represented illthe CPI forboth Federal and State and Local levels of government. Thesecond columiiof the IIt)Iillustiates the proportion of the government sector that is
included in the
CPI when no payroll or corporate tax shifting is assumed.
The post-war decline in the fraction of Federalrevenues represented inthe CPI immediately raises the question "Is total receiptsa proper magnitudeto compare with included revenues?" The historical growth inFederal transfer
payments to individuals suggests that total receipts is perhapsan excessively large
measure to use for a divisor.5
The third column of the table relates Federal exciseand customsrevenues to
Federal purchases of goods and services. Thatcomparison providesa measure of the extent to which expenditureson the national product are reflectedin the
('P1. This measure also indicates that taxes includedin the ('P1 decline inrelation to direct expenditures of the Federal Government.'The lower rank ofTable I
shows calculations comparable to those for theFederal governmentsector for the
State and local government sector. Byany of the measures in TableIthe CPI implicitly rellects a decreasing proportionof the total cost ofgovernment desired by the citiien voter over the period1929-1972. Direct taxes clearlyfinance a larger fraction of Federal expendituresso that the market price conventionmirrors a smaller portion of Federal governmentactivity than State and localactivity. In both cases, the market priceserves as an indicator ofgovernment cost only to the
extent that full forward shifting ol' indirecttaxes, payroll taxes, andproperty taxes occurs.
Using the ('Pt asa proxy for a COL index including
government suffers from another difficulty: namely,so long as public output is notmeasured one cannot
determitie whether increasingexpenditures for public goodsrepresent rising costs kr fixed levels of service,constant costs for increasing levels ofservice, or increased
costs associated with quality changein the goods beingdelivered.
The importance of thislatter point is made clear inthe indices ofgovernment performance recently releasedby the Enter-agency TaskForce on Measuring Federal GovernmentProductivity (1973). The TaskForce has made detailed analyses of theresources required to producea variety of intermediateoutputs within the Federalgovernment. (Vouchers processed,number of checks issued,and similar measures ofwork activity were takenas the measures of intermediate
government product.) The index ofwage expenditure rose rapidly.This is the expenditure magnitude implicitlyincluded in the CPI. Overthe six-year period of measurement wage expendituresrose toI 5percent of their base period value. However. output alsorose, to 113 percent of its baseperiod value. Hence the
Rccer,t theoretk,slspeculation on the optimal Ieelof redistribution contests sucha siew. Hochm.and Rodgers tt97Oargue that the tesel of Federaltransferjsmenis is a component of the 'eslor of public goods nder ices that ought to heconcluded in the utiIitfunction. A comparablecomputation for state and localgoernments is not shon. as iflier.gos ernmental transfers financed hdirect Federal t;sesmust show that the proportion oftax burden measured by the CPI has declinedesen more raptdlin relation to outlaof lesser go%ernmenis.
142appropriate index of cost of output rose to only 140 percentof the base period
value.7 See Table 2.
IABLF2
EXPENDITURE VERSUS COST 0 OUTPUTFEDERAL GOVERNMLNTPR0DUCTIV1ISAMPLE
Source Inter-Agency Task Force (l973, 65
4.MEASURING THE CosT OF LIvING.INCLUSIVE OF PUBLIC GOODSANDSERVICFS
The steps that must be taken to produce aCOL index that includes public
goods and services are outlined in this section.The likelihood of success in such
an undertaking is evaluated.A strategy for research emergesfrom the discussion.
The principal problem in constructing aCOL index is to estimate the para-
meters of the consumer's utilityfunction. According to the theory ofrevealed
preference such estimates can be derivedfrom observations on consumers who are
in equilibrium. Unfortunately mostcitizen-voters are in disequilibriumwith
respect to the quantity of publicgoods provided, unless the votingmechanism
approximates the voluntary exchangemechanism of Lindahl. If not, it is only the
median voter who is in equilibrium withrespect to both public and private con-
sumption.
Consider the community of citizens withprivate consumption c and govern-
nient consumption x. The utility tothe median voter of anycombination is
U(c, x). In the theory of the median voter,the citizen who casts the swing vote on a
quantitative issue of budget determinationis in a position to determine thelevel
of x and the tax price m that he pays forpublic services. Bargaining among voters
assures that the ratio ofprivate good price to the tax price onthe median voter
equals his marginal rate of substitution.The median voter can be regarded as a
maximizing consumer who is in equilibriumin all markets. (Ellickson, 1970).
As a consequence of his role indetermining the size of the government sector,
the median voter is also free to varythe structure of taxation in any waythat he
wishes. However, the voting power ofthe community implies that he cannotreduce
his share of taxation without alsoreducing the size of the government sectorand
conversely. Therefore it is appropriate towrite the budget constraint of themedian
voter as:
= PC +t,X
These calculations assume a labor theoryof value in which the capital costof output moves !fl











1967 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1968 108.3 104.3 105.1 103.1
1969 118.1 111.9 107.9 109.5
1970 132.0 125.2 110.9 119.0
1971 147.1 140.1 112.3 130.9
1972 157.9 152.1 112.8 140.0where the prices ofconsumer goods are measuredat factor cos
the sum of income and net dissaving of themedian voter; ç, isthe "tax price'of public consumption.
To estimate the utility functionwe require data Ofltm' Pj and the shareof the budget ofthe median'oter that is expended on each publicand privateCommodity That is. we require p1e/ },, andlmX/}',,,.Over time thesame individual isfloneces- sarily the median voter, but thiscauses no problems if the utilityfunctiofl isidenhicti! for all citi/.erl-voters in thecommunity. At any instantof time onlyone citi,en. voter is the median voter withrespect to Federal decisions.To identify thepara- meters of a utility function that includesthe Federal Sector,time series dataare obviously required. The budgetshares cannot be derivedfromaggregates as we are interested in the expenditures sharesof the median individual.(While it mayhe possible to approximate thetruth by assuming that themedian voter is thecon- sumer with median income, skewnessin the distribution of
expenditures makes it impossible to assume that themedian equals themean in expenditures)
conclude that for the immediatefuture research efforton the Federalsector had best be directedtowards measures of thecost of governnie,tp, in a frame- work that is not linkedto cost of living indicators.
For the State and localsector a much brighterpictureemerges Cross- section data, suchas the Survey of Consumer
Expenditures (CES),give budget share information fora number of median voters indifferent jurisditj0s$(Such data are observationson particular households livingin particularjurisdictions.) At the municipal levelthere are a sufficientnumber of indepcndeiitchoices of the level ofgovernment output, thatwe can estimate the utilityfunction froma single cross section. For stategovernments several cross-sectionscan be pooled to give the requisite data,The micro.data in theCES will give informationon private budget shares, whileregularly collected Censusof Governmentinformation gives local publicexpenditure information. Themissing data are thetax shares t/p, and p the cost ofproducing governmentoutput. The formermust be evaluated by incidence analysis; thelatter, by studies ofgovernment cost functions. Incidence analysisrequires both themeasurement of direct andindirect taxes paid andan estimate of the effectof shifting ofbusiness taxes andpayroll taxes on the medianvoter. While the formerare already partly includedin the data bases collectedfor obtaining thequantity weights of theCPI, the estimates of shifting are not directlymeasurable, and are notderivable froma set of assumptions that will be easilyagreed upon by theeconomiprofession. Nonetheless,a number of efforts tomeasure incidence of tax burdensindicates thatsome ad hoc principles can be used to solvethe problem(Tax Foundation1966; Musgrave, 1951; Pechman and Okner,1974; and Reynoldsand Smolensky, 1974). The measure ofpublic output is clearlya far more difficult problem.However, there appear tobe numerousareas where proxies foroutput can be generated. The value of timeand its relationto the value oftransport services ha.s been well explored(Mohring, 1972and Walters, 1968).The valuation ofuser-days at
The median votercan be identified dAretlyby studying attitudestowards expenditure and tax measures (M ueller, 1963).However theassumption that the medianvoter is the individual with median Income (Bergstrom andGoodman. 1973) is probablynot tOo far from the truth.
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Irecreational sites has been repeatedlyattempted (Clawson and Knetsch,1966;
see also Cicchetti, 1971for a "pure" application of thistechnique)
In other cases one may argue thatthe public output is not directlymeasurable.
hut that externalities are inversefunctions of the level of publicprovision. Thus the
accident and death rates pervehicle mile travelled constitute aninverse measure
of the output of public servicesfrom highway transport. Theexpected value of
fire damage and theft constitute measuresof the inverse of the valueof public
emergency services.
It would appear that amoderate research effort couldreveal the utility
function for local governmentservices. Bergstrom and Goodman(1973) have
already done some work on the taxshares, but have not settheir estimates of
demand functions in a frameworkin which elasticities ofsubstitution between
public and private goods can beestimated (Christensen, Jorgenson,and Lau,
1973). This is vital for the purposethat we have in mind.
A second conceptual problemis created by the fact that wehave ignored the
quality of public outputs. I feelthat failure to recognize qualityexplicitly in the
utility function and in themeasurement of costs of productionwill be extremely
misleading. What is required is toestimate a production surface inwhich quality
and intensity of public output arejoir tly related to the inputsof labor and capital.9
If, as most students of thepublic sectDr assume, governmentactivity is a superior
good, then it is clear that anincentive exists to substitute additionalquality for
quantity as income rises.Recent work on the estimationof production functions
with joint outputs, by Hasenkamp(1973) gives us methodology tohandle the
problem. What is lacking ingeneral are the data.
To summarize, some immediate progresson the estimationof utility functions
appears possible for thelesser governments in ourFederal system. The first
priority for research is definitionof units of output and systematicwork on govern-
ment cost functions. Asecond priority is to determine the taxshares of median
voters. Maintenance of a costof living index will require annualupdating of these
variables and measurement of theprivate expenditure shares of themedian voters
through a vehicle such as the presentConsumer Expenditure Survey.
I am less sanguine about progressat the Federal level, or progresson the
estimation of joint quality-quantityproduction functions, as we have solittle
data in these areas. Analternative approach to measuring thewelfare impact of the
public sector will be discussed inthe remainder of the paper.
5. A DIRECT MEASURE OFCOST OF LIVING INCLUDING GOVERNMENT
ConstructionofMeasuresofCostof Living From Surveys
An alternative to pricingthe public sector in the mannerdescribed above, is
to develop a direct measureof satisfaction with governmentand deduce changes
in the cost of a fixed levelof living from that index.
In principle we areinterestedittmeasuring the change in the moneyvalue of
the budget constraint ofindividuals who (a) are in equilibriumat two points in
Bergstrom-Goodman and BorcherdingDeacOnfinesse the problem by (a) assuming afixed
coefficients production function relatingquality to public output and (b) deletingquantity variables
from the utility function.
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atime and who (h) report no change in the satisfactionderived fromtheir levelof living. I would like to explore how this idea can heapplied
flicaslire Welfare associated with the public sector.
In his quarter!y surveys Katotia has usedseveral simplequestions to define changes in personal financia! sitnattonc. Similarque;tion; can be used
whether a given household is generally betteror worse ofT thana year ago. Those
who report no change satisfy (b) above. Thisgroup can thcl) be askedto scaletheir opinions on the government sector. Usingquestions similar to those
developed by Mueller (1963) it is possible to rank individualsaccording to theirwillingness to pay additional taxes to support additional services)0Conversely it isPossible to determine the strength of desires to reduceservices in order toCut taxes. The individuals who rank themselvesas unwilling to extend or reducethe governm sector are in equilibrium with respect togovernment; they satisfy
Condition (a) above. The target group, whoare in equilibrium in personal
CCOflOflI dimensions and in equilibrium with respect to thescope of government, is displayed
in Figure I.
A B
Personal Target In Equilibrium
Economic Group With Respect to
Equilibrium Scope of Government
Figure I
In the targetgroup income can bemeasured for thecurrent year and the prior year. I will define the directcost of living as themedian ratio of incomein the current and prioryears for the targetgroup. (If it is preferred,savings can he excluded from theratio, by measuringconsumption and taxes paid,but the measurement or those quantitiesis more difficultand less reliable thanincome.) The direct cost of livingcan be measuredannually. The ratios obtainedover a period of timecan be linked to a fixedbase to givean index of the cost of living includinggovernme
Feasjhjljt1.
isa directmeasure of cost of livingfeasible? I believeit is. The problems that will develop fallinto fourcategories: sampling,development of scales, extraction of an equilibrjIgroup, andmeasurenent of theconsumer budget constraint (i.e., income) The first andlast problemsare thoroughly discussedin the literature Oil !O Amore recent msurement
unfortunately, neglectedo test opini on spending against willingness to raise taxes.See Katona Ct al.(1970). The mostrecent findings (Curtin and Cowan, 19751 include 1973 datacomparable to the 1961 Muellerdata.
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household survey data and need not occupy us here (Hureau of Census, 1968and
Lansing and Morgan. 1971).
Development of a scale for defining personal economic equilibriumdoes
not appear to be a major obstacle. It is true that the developmentof a scale entails
measuring an attitude, a state of mind of consumers, in a replicable andreliable
fashion. A quarter of a century of experience in this area gives us some ideaof the
feasibility of attitude measurement, in a variety of dimensions that relate tothe
problem before us today. The most pertinent measurements ate included inthe
Index of ConsumerSentiment,that has regularly been measured by the University
of Michigan Survey Research into a component that pertains to personalfinancial
dimensions, that are of interest to us here, and more general perceptions of business
conditions.
The Gallup organization reports another type of attitudinal measurement that
bears on the cost of living problem. Since 1946 samples of U.S. adultshave been
asked "What is the smallest amount of money a family of four needs (weekly) to
get along in this community?" Table 3 indicates the meanof those reports, histor-
ically and by community size. The reports have face validity,reflecting both an
increase in perceptions of need greater than the correspondingchanges in the CPI
and a differentiation between the costs for urban dwellers and morerural areas
(Rainwater, 1973).
TABLE3
GALLUP "GET ALONG" WEEKLY AVF.RAGLS BYCOMMUNITY Stz
Up to 100.000 in 1946-512,500 to 49.999 in 1951-54.
2 100,000 to 499.999 in 1946--SI.
5000,000 and over in 1946-54.


















S S S S S
January 1946 35.27 42.13 45.34 52.61 58.5
August-December 1947 36.66 45.88 48.83 53.74 66.9
June 1948 43.29 50.84 54.83 61.31 72.1
May 1949 38.65 49-24 52.81 59.32 71.4
February 1950 40.42 52.51 52.58 52.01 72.1
April-December 1951 44.01 57.84 62.58 64.38 77.8
October 1952 51.12 62.59 66.06 74.98 79.5
March 1953 48.48 62.55 66.67 59.79 801
April 1954 54.44 62.88 65.34 63.70 80.5
November 1957 62.07 69.45 83.39 90.10 75.18 80.2
May 1958 55.00 69.39 74.45 84.10 70.42 86.6
August 1959 66.97 76.42 81.73 97.21 95.50 87.3
August 1960 63.77 79.50 87.25 96.82 82.32 88.7
January 1961 68.72 80.30 88.50 91.99 100.75 89.6
January 1962 71.43 72.99 87.02 92.24 101.28 90.6
April 1963 69.26 78.56 87.77 89.19 99.83 91.7
November 1964 74.08 81.60 86.26 93.56 99.42 92.9
December 1967 92.81 101 115.50 115.83 127.73 100.0
February-October 1969 103.32 109.65 121.80 139.73 142.66 109.8Other measurements of attitudes dearlydemonstrate the abilityto (lOcurnen, important changes in the public perception of itseconomic and Politicalinstitu. lions. Cantril developed a technique tr documentingperception ofpersomtl well. being that has documented the consumer'ssense of progress, a techniquethat can be used to establish the equilibriumgroup of FigureI(Watts andFree, 1973, 22-26). Gallup questionson the effectiveness of inStitutionshas received great publicity in recent months due to the fall inthe esteemaccorded Congress and the Presidency. Thesame type of perceptions are documentedin the Center for Political Studies' index ofTrust in government whichreflected theserious deterioration in public confidence ingovernment accompanying thecredibility crisis associated with the Vietnam War.
These various attitudinal indicesare mentioned to indicatethat attitude measurement is no will 0' the wisp andcan be linked to importantstructural changes in politicaleconomy. Indeed, recent work by Struempel(1973, 1974) suggests models for the interrelationships betweenmeasures offinancial satisfactjo
arid the real economic condition of thefamily. The considerableresearch in this area indicates that householdscan make year-to-yearcomparisons of their personal economic situation.
The more difficult question iswhether ameasurement techniquecan be devised that accurately reflectsthe equilibrium or disequilibriumof an individual with respect to thescope of govcrnmenl activity. Mueller(1963) concludesthat many people do not have a well-definedconcept of government activity,and will give responses thatmust be viewed as contradictorywhen one evaluatestheir implications fer thegovernment budget constraint. Theseconclusions imply that a battery of questions is required todiscriminate individuals withactive consensus to government activity fromothers whoseresponses reflect noise. On themore optimistic side numerousinvestigators have demonstratedthat it is possibleto obtain measures ofsatisfaction with the activitiesof Federal, State andlocal governments and that thesemeasures record important shifts inpriorities for government activity (Cf. Watts and Free,1973; Nation's Cities, 1971).
The development ofa measure of the equilibriunof the individual with respect to government thusrequires careful conceptual groundwork.This should not discourage suchmeasurements. We have not arrivedat a measure of unem ployment rates without arbitrarydefinitions of thesurvey week, and part-time workers. Analogously,definition of an equilibriumgroup for the direct measure of cost of living willrequire a decisionon how to differentiateamong the activities of different levels ofgovernment, how to elicit themargin between the individual's preferred role forgovernment and its current role,and in what way to confront the individual with thetrade-offs requiredamong programs or between publicand private activity.
The job of framingquestions and scales is feasible,but it is not trivial. The extraction ofan equilrbriun groupcan be tackled at a variety ol levels of sophistication Themost primitive would beto define the dimensions of Figure 1 in terms of responses toa nested group of questions.Such a procedureruns the danger thatpersons with Inconsistentresponses or poorly defined preferencesare misclassified. Anerrors-invariables modelsuggests that it may be useful to model the data witha factor analysis (Hauserand Goldberger, 1971and Goldberger and
I 48Joreskog, 1972.) The resultant scaling of the underlying measurescould then be
used to identify the equilibrium set.
Desirub july
A direct measure of the cost of living appears tohave a high priority in the
arsenal of policy-related measures of the economy.Perhaps the most convincing
argument in its favor is to consider the alternatives.Earlier in this paper I argued
that a cost of living measure was unlikely to beimplemented to include the Federal
government. Lack of measures of outputquantity and quality forestall a com-
prehensive approach to the tax price of that sector. TheInter-Agency Task Force
on Productivity has shown usthat some progress on measuring the costof inter-
mediate government products can be made, butfor less than half of the employ-
ment in the Federal sector. This does not seemlike a promising way to relate cost
of government to the consuming public. Continueddependence on the deflator for
government goods and services appears anequally unreasonable approach.
given the known changes in the qualityof government services that we have
experienced and can continue to expect (U.S.-OBE (1955)).
Another class of arguments in favor of a direct measureof the cost of living
lies in the externalities provided by a continuingseries of measurements on the
consumer's satisfaction with governmentactivity and taxation. Continuing
measurements by the Inter-UniversityConsortium for Political Research have
demonstrated that it is possible to quantify a seculardecline in the public trust in
government and their confidence that governmentis acting in the interest of the
average citizen. The lack ofcomparable data on the willingness of the public to
support government activities withadditional tax dollars, and satisfaction with
the tax structure has made it possiblefor a variety of special interest groups to
conduct polls of public opinion with respect togovernment activity. Lacking
standards of comparison it has been impossible tovalidate or disprove the finding
of such polls.
A particularly offensive instance of this typeof data collection was undertaken
by the Advisory Commissionof Inter-Governmental Relations (1973). Thestudy
failed to distinguish random response fromstrongly held opinion and confused
policy issues at several levels of government.Its use of fixed responses strongly
suggests an intention to lead responsein particular directions.
I cite the ACIR study because it appears to methat a continuing data collec-
tion effort directed at direct measuresof cost of living would create a vehicle to
which policy questions on the scopeof government and method of financing
government might easily be added.Lack of continuing measurements ofpublic
preferences relating to the government sectorcreates a perilous gap in policy-
relevant knowledge. Time series measurements aremandatory, as the connotation
of questions in this area cannot be defined asprecisely as questions about income.
We will learn to improve our nieasurementSonly by doing, and criticizing the
results of past efforts.
6.CoNcLuSIONS
Three conclusions can be drawn from thisanalysis. First, a pressing need
exists to invest in the creation of welfareindicators that reflect government activity
149fully and explicitly. Thepost-war erosion of the degree to whichgovernment is
reflected in the CPJ casts tealdoubts on the advisahihty of' using that indexas a
proxy for a cost of living index. Yetwe are being pushed in that direction by chronic
inflation, measured withoutcorrection for improvements in thequantity or quality of government.
A second conclusion is thatwe are unlikely to make a rapid breakthrough in
explicitly representing the Federalsector in a cost of living index asoutput mea-
sures do not exist and a time series approachwill be required to measure the pref-
erence function of the median voter. Asan alternative, a direct measure of thecost
of living can be obtained fromregular surveys of consumer satisfactionwith the public sector. Enough experiencehas been assembled on this problem,so that a pilot program ofmeasurement can be undertaken. The scienceof attitudinal
measurement has advanced to a point whereresults of value for policy-makingcan be assumed. A commitmentto undertake direct measurement ofcost of living through attitudinalmeasures for a five-year periodseems to me to be the most
likely means for advancingour understanding of cost of living and itsrelationship to costs of government.
The last conclusion thatmay be drawn from the discussion is thatcost of living measures including theState and localgovernment sector can be devised with data at hand. The biggeststumbling blocks are quantificationof output, up-to-date
measures of cost functions, andtechniques for integrating quantityand quality in a single productionconstraint. While furtherprogress in this direction is feasible, it is less significant thanwork on the Federalsector. Relative to State and local
governmcji a much smaller proportionof Federalgovernment revenue is now
implicitly represented in theCPI. In absolute terms barelyhalf of Federal receipts are reflected in the prices measuredby the CPI, even when fullforward shifting is assumed. For thisreason I again conclude thata direct, attitudinal measure of changes in satisfactionwith government linkedto changes in money incomeis more likely to produce neededinformation concerning theconsumer's level of living than research usingmore traditional data.
University of Wisconsin
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